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Abstract
This paper uses data from the Demographic and Health Surveys to examine the current 
status of fertility transition in sub-Saharan Africa, including the extent to which fertility 
decline has stalled. Among the two dozen countries covered by multiple surveys, 22 have 
initiated fertility transition, and a third of these countries have experienced stalling of 
fertility decline. We study the links between changes in contraceptive use, fertility 
preferences, and socioeconomic development (as reflected in changes in women's 
education, infant and child mortality, and real per-capita economic growth) and fertility 
decline and stalling. Changes in the measures of socioeconomic development are all 
related to the likelihood of stalling. We also analyze determinants of age-specific fertility 
rates in urban and rural places, and assess future prospects for fertility decline in the 
region. Progress in increasing women's educational attainment and in reducing infant and 
child mortality are identified as key factors contributing to sustained fertility decline. 
Key words:  fertility, stalling, education, infant/child mortality
Résumé
Cet article utilise les données issues des Enquêtes Démographiques et de Santé afin 
d'examiner l'état actuel de la transition de la fécondité en Afrique sub-saharienne, y 
compris le ralentissement ou l'interruption du processus de transition. Parmi les 24 pays 
couverts par au moins deux enquêtes, la baisse de la fécondité s'est amorcée dans 22 pays, 
mais ce processus s'est ensuite arrêtée dans un-tiers de ces pays. Nous étudions les liens 
entre les changements dans l'utilisation de la contraception moderne, les préférences en 
matière de fécondité, et le développement socio-économique (mesuré par l'accroissement 
de la scolarisation des femmes, la baisse de la mortalité infantile et juvénile, et la 
croissance du PNB brut réel par habitant) d'une part, et la baisse et la stabilisation de la 
fécondité, de l'autre part. Les résultats indiquent un lien entre chacun de ces indicateurs du 
développement socio-économique et la probabilité de voir une transition interrompue. 
Nous analysons également les déterminants des taux de fécondité par âge dans les milieux 
urbain et rural, et nous essayons d'évaluer les perspectives d'avenir de la baisse de la 
fécondité dans la région. L'augmentation de la scolarisation des femmes et la réduction de 
la mortalité infantile et juvénile apparaissent comme facteurs clefs pour une baisse 
soutenue de la fécondité. 
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Introduction
During the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s, 
as fertility decline spread throughout 
much of the Third World, sub-Saharan 
Africa was distinguished as the only major 
region in the world without any indication 
of onset of fertility transition (Lesthaeghe, 
1989a).  A substantial literature emerged 
that discussed the various social, cultural, 
and economic factors that served to 
maintain fertility at high levels in Africa 
south of the Sahara.
By the early 1990s, however, it 
began to be apparent that change was 
taking place, and that fertility in at least a 
few African nations was beginning to fall.  
Over the past 15 years, several studies have 
documented, first, the spread of fertility 
transition throughout the region (Tabutin, 
1997 ;  Cohen,  1998 ;  Tabut in  and 
Schoumaker, 2001; Garenne and Joseph, 
2002; Shapiro and Tambashe, 2002; Shapiro 
et al., 2003), and more recently, the stalling 
of the transition in some countries that had 
been at the forefront of fertility decline in 
sub-Saharan Africa (Bongaarts, 2005, 2007; 
Westoff and Cross, 2005).
This paper uses data from the 
numerous Demographic and Health 
Surveys that have been carried out in sub-
Saharan Africa to examine the current 
status of fertility transition in the region, 
including the extent to which fertility 
decline has stalled; to study the links 
between changes in contraceptive use, 
fertility preferences, and socioeconomic 
development (as reflected in changes in 
women's education, infant and child 
mortality, and real per-capita economic 
growth) and fertility decline and stalling; 
to analyze determinants of age-specific 
fertility rates in urban and rural areas; and 
to assess future prospects for fertility 
decline in the region.  We focus on survey 
results from the 24 countries that have had 
multiple Demographic and Health 
Surveys, since these data, representing 
more than three-quarters of the region's 
population, provide direct evidence on 
fertility transition within individual 
countries.
In his analysis of the causes of 
stalling fertility transitions, Bongaarts 
(2005, Table 1) provides an overview of 
national total fertility rates (TFRs) in recent 
DHS surveys in 38 countries, half of which 
are from sub-Saharan Africa.  Among 
these 19 African countries, two are 
identified as stalled (Ghana and Kenya), 12 
show a declining trend, and the remaining 
five cases are essentially considered as 
either pre-transitional or in the early stages 
of fertility transition.  Bongaarts focuses on 
countries experiencing a stall in fertility in 
mid-transition, where stall is defined 
operationally as a failure of the national 
TFR to decline between the two most 
recent DHS surveys, and mid-transition 
refers to countries in which the TFR has 
fallen to at least 5 as of the most recent 
survey.
Our approach, with an expanded 
set of countries and results from several 
more recent surveys, is similar to that of 
Bongaarts in that we focus on changes in 
national TFRs between the two most recent 
DHS surveys in order to distinguish falling 
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from stalling fertility.  However, we also 
identify and analyze behavior in several 
countries that appear to be experiencing 
stalling in early stages of fertility 
transition.  That is, we distinguish mid-
transition stalls from early-transition stalls.  
In addition, reflecting our own previous 
work (Shapiro and Tambashe, 2002; 
Shapiro et al., 2003) as well as work by 
Garenne and Joseph (2002), we examine 
TFRs not only at the national level but also 
separately for urban and rural places.  
Indeed, not unlike elsewhere, fertility 
transition in sub-Saharan Africa is first 
manifested in urban places, prior to being 
evident in rural areas.
The first substantive part of the 
paper, then, consists of an up-to-date 
assessment of the fertility transition in sub-
Saharan Africa.  As noted, we focus on 
those countries that have been covered by 
multiple DHS surveys.  In some of these 
countries (e.g., Kenya, Ghana, Cameroon) 
it is apparent from the most recent surveys 
that the declines in fertility that had been 
realized during the 1990s seem to have 
halted, and a certain stability in the overall 
level of fertility has emerged, at least for 
the time being.  Whether these stalls will be 
temporary or longer-lasting remains to be 
seen.
In the second substantive section of 
the paper, we examine factors presumed to 
be contributing to fertility decline and 
fertility stall in sub-Saharan Africa.  
Among these African countries, do 
differences in contraceptive use or in 
fertility preferences help account for which 
countries are experiencing stalling?  
Bongaarts (2005, p. 2) noted that “[t]he 
stalls appear to be attributable at least in 
part to a lack of recent progress in 
socioeconomic development in Ghana and 
Kenya.” In subsequent work, Bongaarts 
(2007, p. 13) has suggested that “lack of 
recent progress in development in sub-
Saharan Africa is partly responsible for the 
very slow pace of reproductive change” 
that he documents based on analysis of 
TFRs in the most recent intervals between 
DHS surveys. 
More broadly, as Bongaarts and 
Watkins (1996) and Bongaarts (2002) have 
n o t e d ,  l e v e l s  o f  s o c i o e c o n o m i c  
development at which fertility decline is 
initiated appear to have declined over 
time.  Sub-Saharan Africa's overall 
development level has been low, and 
countries in the region may consequently 
be especially susceptible to stalling of 
fertility decline.  At the same time, 
however, there is certainly variation in the 
pace of development across countries.  
Within the African context, can differences 
in socioeconomic development help 
explain falling and stalling fertility?  For 
example, has slowing of progress in 
augmenting women's educational 
attainment contributed to stalling of 
fertility transition?  Likewise, following 
Bongaarts, we examine the impact of 
changes in infant and child mortality and 
changes in real GDP per capita on fertility 
decline.  The relationships between 
fertility decline and these various factors 
are examined in a multivariate context.
The concluding substantive part of 
the paper presents multivariate regression 
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analyses of the age-specific fertility rates of 
urban and rural women and of key 
proximate determinants of fertility.  These 
analyses seek to identify factors 
contributing to differences in fertility 
levels and changes.  Our earlier work on 
fert i l i ty transit ion in the region 
emphasized the importance of women's 
education in contributing to fertility 
decline, both directly and via the 
proximate determinants of marriage and 
contraceptive use, as well as via the 
influence of education on infant and child 
mortality.  We explore the robustness of 
these conclusions in the face of new data 
including stalling experience, and with 
additional countries.  The paper concludes 
with a discussion regarding the future of 
fertility transition in the region and policy 
implications of our findings.
Fertility Transition in Sub-Saharan 
Africa
An overview of fertility transition 
in sub-Saharan Africa is provided by the 
data in Table 1, which gives national total 
fertility rates as well as those for rural and 
urban places for each DHS survey where 
there have been multiple DHS surveys.  
For each country, the table also identifies 
the trend in fertility, based on examination 
of the national TFR in the two most recent 
surveys.
As shown in Table 1, we find that 
stalling of fertility transition characterizes 
eight of the 24 countries, while 14 countries 
show a declining trend and the remaining 
two countries may be characterized as pre-
transitional.  The eight countries identified 
as experiencing stalling include three that 
fit the mid-transition classification used by 
Bongaarts (Cameroon has been added to 
Ghana and Kenya), and five others that are 
at an earlier stage in their fertility 
transitions, with national TFRs in the 
neighborhood of 5.5 to 6 and no decline or 
an increase in the national TFR between the 
two most recent surveys (Guinea, 
Mozambique, Rwanda, Senegal, and 
Tanzania).  As compared to Bongaarts 
(2005), then, we point to a greater incidence 
of stalling, primarily because of the less 
restrictive definition of stalling that we 
have used to identify cases of early stalling.
At the same time, most countries 
continue to experience fertility decline.  
This is a heterogeneous group with respect 
1
1 One exception here is the 1999 DHS for Nigeria.  Concerns 
about data reliability prompted us to exclude results from 
that survey. 
. 
2
3
2 The bulk of the data in Table 1 is from the STATcompiler 
available at the DHS web site.  In several cases, though (as 
indicated in the table), the data were obtained from 
ORC/Macro published reports because they are not available 
on the STATcompiler.  These include three quite recent 
surveys and three older surveys. 
 
3 That is, these five countries meet the first of the two criteria 
used by Bongaarts – viz., failure of the national TFR to 
decline between the two most recent surveys.  Rwanda, 
Senegal, and Tanzania are identified in Table 1 of Bongaarts 
(2005) as countries experiencing fertility decline. The status 
or Rwanda and Tanzania has changed due to new survey 
data, while our inclusion of the 1999 Senegal DHS leads us 
to classify Senegal as stalled.  From among these five 
countries, only Senegal and Tanzania show (via the DHS 
data) a decline of at least close to 10 percent in the national 
TFR.  However, for each of these countries comparisons of 
United Nations estimates of national TFRs in the 1970s and 
1980s with DHS estimates suggest that fertility decline of at 
least 10 percent had taken place prior to the emergence of 
stalling.  Further, from the available DHS data it is apparent 
that at least in urban places, fertility had previously declined 
in Guinea and in Mozambique, as well as in Senegal and 
Tanzania. 
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to fertility change, including both 
countries where the most recent declines in 
fertility have been substantial (e.g., Eritrea, 
Namibia, and Togo) as well as countries in 
which fertility at the national level has 
declined but rather modestly (e.g., Chad, 
Cote d'Ivoire, and Ethiopia).  Finally, the 
pre-transitional countries (Mali and Niger) 
are those in which the national TFR is on 
the order of 7, and where there has been 
little or no decline across surveys.  Figure 1 
shows the 8 stalling countries and the 14 
declining nations, ordered by the size of 
the decline per year in the TFR between the 
two most recent surveys.
As in previous work on fertility 
transition in the region (Shapiro and 
Tambashe, 2002; Shapiro et al., 2003), we 
also examine data for urban and rural 
places separately.  In our earlier studies we 
noted that initially fertility tended to fall 
primarily in urban places, while rural 
fertility remained stable or increased.  
Garenne and Joseph (2002) also emphasize 
the key role of urban places in the onset of 
fertility transition in the region.  Our 
earlier research suggested that subsequent 
to the initial drop in fertility limited to 
urban areas, fertility declined in both 
urban and rural places, but typically the 
decline was greater in the urban milieu.  
And finally, in the few countries in the 
region in which fertility transition was 
relatively advanced, fertility fell as rapidly 
or more so in rural areas as compared to 
urban areas.
These observations were made 
prior to the emergence of stalling.  Table 1 
allows examination of the extent of stalling 
separately for urban and rural places.  
Among the mid-transition stalled 
countries (Cameroon, Ghana, Kenya), in 
which overall fertility is relatively low, we 
see increases in both rural and urban 
fertility most recently.  That is, stalling is 
pervasive in these countries, regardless of 
place of residence.  The early-transition 
stalled countries, by contrast, show greater 
variability, at least for urban places.  These 
countries, which all have their most recent 
national TFRs above 5 and rural TFRs 
above 6, typically have reported increases 
recently in rural fertility, while there is no 
clear pattern vis-à-vis changes in urban 
fertility, with declines reported in two 
cases, an increase in two others, and 
stability in the fifth case.  Countries that 
nationally show only small declines in the 
TFR often have stalled rural fertility in 
conjunction with urban fertility that is still 
declining.
In sum, then, the data in Table 1 
highlight several observations regarding 
fertility transition in sub-Saharan Africa, 
based on data at the national level from 24 
countries with multiple DHS surveys.  
First, with the exception of only a couple of 
countries, it is evident that fertility 
transition has been initiated throughout 
the region.  Second, the majority of the 
countries in which fertility decline has 
4
4 We have categorized countries as stalling or declining 
based on Bongaarts (2005). In subsequent work, Bongaarts 
(2007) has used a more stringent criterion for fertility 
decline: failure to experience “a significant fertility decline 
between the two most recent surveys” (p. 12). This more 
stringent criterion for decline implies a less restrictive 
definition of stalling.  For example, had we required a 
decline in the national TFR of at least 0.2 in order to identify 
a country as declining, we would have reported 11 stalling 
countries and 11 countries in which fertility is still declining. 
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begun continue to experience decline, 
albeit with a fair degree of variability in the 
pace of that reduction.  Third, countries in 
which fertility transition has stalled (the 
national TFR has failed to continue its 
previous decline) may be divided into two 
groups: those in which the prior fertility 
decline had brought the national TFR to 5 
or less (mid-transition stall) and those in 
which the prior decline in fertility was 
more modest and the national TFR was 
approximately 5.5 to 6 (early-transition 
stall).
Further, disaggregation of national 
data into urban and rural components 
indicates that fertility decline tends to be 
stronger in urban places.  Among those 
countries with a declining trend in fertility, 
it is typically the case that in comparing the 
two most recent surveys the magnitude of 
the decline is greater in urban areas than in 
rural areas (in only four of 14 cases does the 
rural decline exceed the urban decline).  
And countries experiencing stalling 
nationally, at least at the early-transition 
stage, in some cases still experience 
fertility decline in urban areas.  We turn 
now to an examination of factors 
contributing to observed fertility behavior.
Table 1. Estimated Total Fertility Rates, National and by Rural and  
Urban Residence, and Trend:  Countries with Multiple Surveys  
Country (year of survey) TFR  Trend  
  National  Rural  Urban   
Benin (1996) 6.0 6.7  4.9   
Benin (2001) 5.6 6.4  4.4  decline  
Burkina Faso (1992/93)* 6.9 7.3  5.0   
Burkina Faso (1998/99) 6.4 6.9  3.9   
Burkina Faso (2003) 5.9 6.5  3.4  decline  
Cameroon (1991) 5.8 6.3  5.2   
Cameroon (1998) 4.8 5.4  3.8   
Cameroon (2004) 5.0 6.1  4.0  mid-transition stall  
Chad (1996/97) 6.4 6.5  5.9   
Chad (2004) 6.3 6.5  5.7  decline  
Cote d'Ivoire (1994) 5.3 6.0  4.4   
Cote d'Ivoire (1998/99) 5.2 6.0  4.0  decline  
Eritrea (1995) 6.1 7.0  4.2   
Eritrea (2002) 4.8 5.7  3.5  decline  
Ethiopia (2000) 5.5 6.0  3.0   
Ethiopia (2005) 5.4 6.0  2.4  decline  
Ghana (1988) 6.4 7.0  5.3   
Ghana (1993) 5.2 6.0  3.7   
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Country (year of survey)
 
TFR
 
Trend
 
  
National 
 
Rural
 
Urban
  
Ghana (1998)
 
4.4
 
5.3
 
3.0
  
Ghana (2003)
 
4.4
 
5.6
 
3.1
 
mid-transition stall
 
Guinea (1992)*
 
5.7
 
5.9
 
5.2
  
Guinea (1999)
 
5.5
 
6.1
 
4.4
  
Guinea (2005)
 
5.7
 
6.3
 
4.4
 
early-transition stall
 
Kenya (1989)
 
6.7
 
7.1
 
4.5
  
Kenya (1993) 5.4 5.8  3.4   
Kenya (1998) 4.7 5.2  3.1   
Kenya (2003) 4.9 5.4  3.3  mid-transition stall  
Madagascar (1992) 6.1 6.7  3.8   
Madagascar (1997) 6.0 6.7  4.2   
Madagascar (2003/04) 5.2 5.7  3.7  decline  
Malawi (1992) 6.7 6.9  5.5   
Malawi (2000) 6.3 6.7  4.5   
Malawi (2004) 6.0 6.4  4.2  decline  
Mali (1987) 7.1 7.4  6.3   
Mali (1995/96) 6.7 7.3  5.4   
Mali (2001) 6.8 7.3  5.5  pre-transition  
Mozambique (1997) 5.2 5.3  4.6   
Mozambique (2003) 5.5 6.1  4.4  early-transition stall  
Namibia (1992) 5.4 6.3  4.0   
Namibia (2000) 4.2 5.1  3.1  decline  
Niger (1992) 7.0 7.1  6.4   
Niger (1998) 7.2 7.6  5.6   
Niger (2006)* 7.1 7.4  6.0  pre-transition  
Nigeria (1990)
 
6.0
 
6.3
 
5.0
  
Nigeria (2003)
 
5.7
 
6.1
 
4.9
 
decline
 
Rwanda (1992)
 
6.2
 
6.3
 
4.5
  
Rwanda (2000)
 
5.8
 
5.9
 
5.2
  
Rwanda (2005)
 
6.1
 
6.3
 
4.9
 
early-transition stall
 
Senegal (1986)
 
6.4
 
7.1
 
5.4
  Senegal (1992/93)
 
6.0
 
6.7
 
5.1
  Senegal (1997)
 
5.7
 
6.7
 
4.3
  Senegal (1999)*
 
5.2
 
6.1
 
3.9
  Senegal (2005)
 
5.3
 
6.4
 
4.1
 
early-transition stall
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Country (year of survey)
 
TFR
 
Trend
 
  National  Rural  Urban   
Tanzania (1992) 6.2 6.6  5.1   
Tanzania (1996) 5.8 6.3  4.1   
Tanzania (1999) 5.6 6.5  3.2   
Tanzania (2004) 5.7 6.5  3.6  early-transition stall  
Togo (1988) 6.4 7.3  4.9   
Togo (1998) 5.2 6.3  3.2  decline  
Uganda (1988) 7.4 7.6  5.7   
Uganda (1995) 6.9 7.2  5.0   
Uganda (2000/01) 6.9 7.4  4.0   
Uganda (2006)* 6.7 7.1  4.4  decline  
Zambia (1992) 6.5 7.1  5.8   
Zambia (1996) 6.1 6.9  5.1   
Zambia (2001/02) 5.9 6.9  4.3  decline  
Zimbabwe (1988/89) 5.4 6.2  3.8   
Zimbabwe (1994) 4.3 4.9  3.1   
Zimbabwe (1999) 4.0 4.6  3.0   
Zimbabwe (2005/06)* 3.8 4.6  2.6  decline  Except as noted, data are from ORC Macro’s online St atCompiler, and provide TFRs based on  the three years preceding each survey. *
 
Estimates obtained from DHS Final Report 
Factors Contributing to Fertility Decline 
and Fertility Stall
In this section we examine several 
factors that, based on both models of 
fertility behavior and empirical studies of 
fertility and fertility transition, seem likely 
to be pertinent to the falling and stalling of 
fertility.  More specifically, we look at 
changes in these factors between the next-
to-last and the most recent DHS survey in 
each country, and relate those changes to 
the corresponding changes in the national 
total fertility rate.
We begin with consideration of the 
link between changes in the educational 
attainment of women of reproductive age 
and changes in the TFR.  A considerable 
body of research underscores the general 
inverse association between education and 
fertility (see, for example, Jejeebhoy, 1995; 
Rutstein, 2002), and our own prior work 
(Shapiro et al., 2003; Shapiro and 
Tambashe,  2003)  emphasizes  the 
importance of women's education as a key 
factor contributing to fertility decline in 
sub-Saharan Africa.  Since the secular 
trend is toward increased education of 
women (Schultz, 1993), this implies 
increases over time in the percentage of 
women with secondary or higher 
education and reductions in the 
percentage of women with no schooling.  
10
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We anticipated that countries with 
relatively large increases in the share of 
women with at least some secondary 
schooling would exhibit larger declines in 
fertility as compared to countries with 
smaller increases or with decreases in the 
proportion of women with secondary or 
higher education.  By the same token, 
countries with relatively large declines in 
the percentage of women with no 
schooling were expected to manifest larger 
declines in fertility.
A second factor pertinent to fertility 
behavior is mortality experience.  The 
Easterlin framework for fertility analysis 
(Easterlin, 1975; Easterlin and Crimmins, 
1985) views changes in mortality as a key 
factor influencing actual fertility, via the 
impact on the supply of children and 
ultimately on the motivation for fertility 
control.  Indeed, observed increases in 
mortality in DHS surveys in West Africa 
during the late 1990s (Barrère et al., 1999), 
in the context of Easterlin's model, would 
be the sort of phenomenon likely to 
contribute to stalling of fertility transition.  
In our initial exploratory work we found 
that lagged changes in mortality were 
more closely related to fertility changes 
than were contemporaneous mortality 
changes.  Further, the infant and child 
mortality rate appeared to perform better 
than the infant mortality rate.  Hence, in 
the analyses below we used the infant and 
5
6
5 Data are from the Penn World Tables (Heston et al., 2006).  
Since fertility is measured for the three years preceding the 
survey, this lag means that we are looking at the change in 
GDP per capita for roughly the five-year period preceding 
the period during which fertility is measured. 
 
6 In an early version of the equation in the table, ideal family 
size had a coefficient that was essentially zero, and the 
variable has been dropped from our analyses. 
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Fig. 1.   Decline in the Total Fertility Rate per Year, Stalling and Declining Countries 
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child mortality rate, lagged 5-9 years.  
We also examine growth in GDP 
per capita in relation to fertility decline.  
Historically, fertility transition was 
generally accompanied by sustained 
economic growth.  At the same time, 
however, there is some literature 
suggesting that economic difficulties 
experienced by countries in sub-Saharan 
Africa during the 1980s and 1990s may 
have contributed to crisis-led fertility 
declines (e.g., see Lesthaeghe, 1989b; 
Eloundou-Enyegue et al., 2000; National 
Research Council, 1993).  In the analyses 
reported below, we use lagged estimates of 
growth in real GDP per capita for the 
period from three to eight years prior to the 
most recent survey.
Increased use of modern contraception is 
typically strongly associated with fertility 
decline, so we examine changes in use of 
modern contraception and their relation to 
fertility changes.  Finally, we also looked at 
changes in fertility preferences (ideal 
family size) in relation to changes in 
observed fertility.
We estimated a multivariate 
equation to account for these most recent 
changes in national-level fertility, using all 
of the variables just considered except ideal 
family size.  This equation is reported in the 
first column of coefficients in Table 2.  More 
rapid growth in female educational 
attainment, as reflected both by greater 
increases in the percentage of women of 
reproductive age with at least secondary 
education and by larger declines in the 
percentage of women with no schooling, is 
significantly associated with larger 
declines in fertility.  Greater declines in the 
lagged infant and child mortality rate are 
significantly associated with more rapid 
fertility decline.  For these variables, then, 
t h e  i m p l i c a t i o n  i s  t h a t  s l o w e r  
socioeconomic progress contributes to the 
stalling of fertility transition.  At the same 
time, however, and in contrast, more rapid 
(lagged) growth in GDP per capita 
translates into significantly slower declines 
in fertility, other things equal.  On this 
count, then, economic growth appears to 
be contributing to stalling fertility.  
C h a n g e s  i n  t h e  u s e  o f  m o d e r n  
contraception are not related to recent 
changes in fertility.  Overall, these 
variables account for more than 60 percent 
of the variation in the declines in the total 
fertility rate between the two most recent 
surveys.
The second column of Table 2 
extends the analysis, with data now 
reported separately for urban and rural 
places, so the number of observations has 
doubled.  In addition, a dummy variable 
for urban areas is included.  This second set 
of estimates is quite similar to the first.  
7
7 In analyzing data by place of residence, we were unable to 
use data from the most recent surveys in Niger and Uganda, 
since the data are not yet available.  Hence, for these two 
countries we had to use earlier data.  In addition, for urban 
and rural places, the STATcompiler does not provide 
mortality estimates for the period 5-9 years prior to the 
survey, but rather for the period 0-9 years prior to the 
survey.  To check for the robustness of our results, we 
reestimated the first equation in Table 2 using the same 
surveys as those in the second equation.  The estimated 
coefficients were very similar to those reported in the table, 
both in magnitude and in significance, with the exception of 
the mortality coefficient, which remained highly significant 
but was twice as large as that reported in the table (i.e., it 
was closer to the coefficient reported in the second column of 
the table). 
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Table 2.  Regression Analysis of the Decline in the Total Fertility Rate  
Between the Two Most Recent Survey 
 
Variable 
National 
Data 
Data by 
urban/rural 
 
Decline in percentage of women with no schooling .036+ .039* 
Increase in percentage of women with at least secondary 
education 
.031+ .018 
Growth in the percentage of women using modern 
contraception 
.006 .011 
Decline in the infant and child mortality ratea  .0048* .0081** 
Percentage growth in GDP per capita over 5 years (3-year 
lag) 
-.010** -.0098** 
Urban --- .191+ 
Intercept -.041 -.104 
 
R2 .618 .572 
R2 .512 .509 
F-Ratio 5.83** 9.13** 
N 24 48 
 
a     For national-level data, we use the infant and child mortality rate for the period 
5-9 years prior to the survey; for data separately for urban and rural places, we use 
the infant and child mortality rate for the period 0-9 years prior to the survey. 
 
**  Significant at the .01 level. 
*    Significant at the .05 level. 
+     Significant at the .10 level. 
Both of the education variables have the 
expected sign, although only one 
coefficient is significant.  Declining 
mortality is significantly associated with 
more rapid fertility decline, while more 
rapid GDP growth appears to result in 
slower fertility declines.  And other thing 
equal, fertility decline tends to be more 
rapid in urban areas.  These results, then, 
indicate that falling and stalling fertility are 
very much influenced by socioeconomic 
development, most notably as reflected in 
women's education, infant and child 
mortality, and growth in GDP per capita.
8
8 These estimates parallel our earlier ones (Shapiro et al., 
2003), but cover a larger number of countries (we analyzed 
data for 16 countries previously) and include more recent 
data, most notably data that reveals stalling.  
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Multivariate Analyses of Age-Specific 
Fertility Rates
In this section, we extend our 
analyses to examine age-specific fertility 
rates in urban and rural areas of the DHS 
countries with multiple surveys.  More 
specifically, we analyze the factors 
influencing age-specific fertility rates by 
estimating a series of regressions 
comparable to those estimated in our 
previous work (Shapiro et al., 2003).  In 
each case, we use data from the two most 
recent DHS surveys.
For each five-year age group, we regress 
the age-specific fertility rates of women in 
urban and rural areas on variables 
measuring the percentage of women in the 
age group and corresponding place of 
residence who had no schooling, the 
percentage with secondary or higher 
education, the percentage in union, the 
percentage of women in union using 
modern contraception, the infant and child 
mortality rate (5q0), and a dummy variable 
distinguishing urban from rural areas.  In 
addition, in light of the finding by 
Bongaarts and Watkins (1996) and 
Bongaarts (2002) that as time goes by, 
fertility decline occurs at progressively 
l o w e r  l e v e l s  o f  s o c i o e c o n o m i c  
development, we also include a variable 
identifying a time trend.
For these analyses of age-specific 
fertility, it is plausible to anticipate that the 
error terms for different age groups may be 
correlated.  That is, in countries where 
fertility of one age group is comparatively 
high or low, given the values of the 
explanatory variables, it is likely that 
fertility of other age groups may 
correspondingly be high or low as well.  
Correlations like this would emerge in the 
presence of country-specific factors whose 
influence cut across various age groups, 
and we found such correlations in our 
p r e v i o u s  w o r k .   U n d e r  t h e s e  
circumstances, the appropriate estimation 
is via the method of seemingly unrelated 
regressions (SUR) rather than via OLS 
(Greene, 2000, pp. 614 ff.).  Consequently, 
the estimates reported below are SUR 
estimates.
In considering the likely impacts of 
the explanatory variables, we anticipated 
that the percentage of women with no 
schooling, the percentage in union, and the 
infant and child mortality rate would all be 
positively related to age-specific fertility 
rates, while the percentage with secondary 
and higher education and the percentage of 
women in union who were using modern 
contraception were expected to be 
negatively related to fertility.  The dummy 
variable for urban residence was expected 
to have a negative coefficient, reflecting the 
lower net benefits of children to parents in 
urban places.  We anticipated as well that 
other things equal, fertility rates would be 
9
9 In contrast to the other variables just identified (apart from 
the urban dummy), the infant and child mortality rate was not 
calculated separately for each age group; rather, it was 
simply the urban or rural rate across all age groups of 
mothers.  Initially we also included a variable measuring 
GDP growth.  Since GDP growth is not available separately 
by place of residence, this variable was measured at the 
national level, and hence the same value was used for both 
urban and rural places.  The variable was almost always not 
significant, and its use meant dropping Eritrea from the 
sample because of lack of data on GDP growth for the 
earlier survey.  Hence, we have dropped GDP growth so as 
to retain the full set of 24 countries. 
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lower in later years (i.e., the expected 
coefficients for the time trend are negative).
.
The results of our analyses are 
reported in Table 3.  For each age group, we 
give the coefficients for the regression 
described above.  Other things being equal, 
fertility is significantly lower in urban 
places, with the differential being greater 
than 40 births per 1000 for women in their 
20s, 30-36 for those aged 30-44, and 
somewhat smaller for the youngest and 
oldest women.  The coefficients for the two 
education variables provide little 
indication of the expected positive effect on 
fertility of higher percentages of women 
with no schooling or the anticipated 
negative effect of women with secondary 
or greater education.
Between ages 25 and 44 there is a 
significant negative association between 
modern contraceptive use and fertility, 
while there is an unexpected positive 
coefficient for contraception for the 
youngest group.  The percentage of 
women in union is significantly positively 
related to fertility for all but one group up 
through the 35-39 age group, with the 
significant coefficients declining as age 
increases.  Higher infant and child 
mortality rates are associated with 
significantly higher age-specific fertility 
rates between ages 20 and 34.  There are 
significant negative coefficients on the time 
trend variable for all but one group, 
indicating that, other things equal, fertility 
rates are lower in later years as compared 
to earlier years.
10
Table 3.  Multivariate Analyses of Age-Specific Fertility Rates 
 
Schooling 
 
Age 
Group 
 
 
Urban None Secondary+ 
 
Modern 
Contraception 
 
In 
Union 
 
 
5qo 
 
Time 
Trend 
 
 
Intercept  R2 
15-19 -25.21** -.12 .10 1.39** 2.47** .10 -1.49* 70.5** .734 
20-24 -43.62** -.28* .00 .13 1.70** .25** -1.68* 142.34** .713 
25-29 -41.51** -.14 .31* -.78** .91** .31** -1.33+ 168.23** .644 
30-34 -36.16** .11 .20 -1.32** .13 .22* -.11 198.01** .523 
35-39 -36.06** .14 -.14 -.66** .66* .05 -1.33+ 129.90** .590 
40-44 -30.61** .02 -.15 -.69** -.18 .01 -1.37** 131.30** .612 
45-49 -17.57** .19** -.01 .09 .01 -.05 -1.01** 43.03** .425 
 
** Significant at the .01 level. 
*   Significant at the .05 level. 
+   Significant at the .10 level. 
Sample size = 96.  Estimates from SUR model. 
10 We are grateful to Paul Schultz for drawing our attention 
to this point. 
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effects of women's educational attainment 
on fertility at first glance seems somewhat 
surprising. However, the equations 
reported in Table 3 include two proximate 
determinants of fertility, use of modern 
contraception and the percentage in union, 
that are themselves influenced by women's 
educational attainment.  Further, there is a 
large body of literature suggesting that 
increased women's schooling contributes 
to lower infant and child mortality.  By 
including in Table 3 these variables that are 
themselves influenced by education, we 
may have thereby given a misleading (and 
downward-biased) view of the importance 
of education for fertility transition in the 
region.
To assess this argument, then, we 
have estimated equations showing the 
relationship between women's educational 
attainment and these three education-
r e l a t e d  e x p l a n a t o r y  v a r i a b l e s  
(contraception, in union, mortality) from 
Table 3.  That is, we regressed the 
prevalence of modern contraception, the 
percentage of women in union, and the 
infant and child mortality rate on the two 
dummy variables for educational 
attainment, and we also included the urban 
dummy variable and the time trend as 
explanatory variables in these equations.  
As in Table 3, we used the method of 
seemingly unrelated regressions.  The 
results of this estimation are provided in 
Table 4.
The near absence of significant T h e  i n f l u e n c e  o f  w o m e n ' s  
educational attainment on these variables 
is evident, especially so for use of modern 
contraception and being in union.  Higher 
percentages of women with no schooling 
result in lower contraceptive use, greater 
marriage rates, and, among the two 
youngest age groups only, higher levels of 
infant and child mortality.  Conversely, 
greater percentages of women with 
secondary or higher education are clearly 
associated with greater contraceptive use 
and with lower percentages in union 
among women up through age 39, but 
there is no evidence of significantly lower 
infant and child mortality rates.  Overall, 
then, it is evident that education influences 
these three variables: other things equal, a 
better-educated population of women of 
reproductive age is associated with greater 
use of modern contraception, lower rates of 
women in union, and to a lesser degree, 
lower infant and child mortality.
Urban residence is significantly 
associated with greater use of modern 
contraception, lower percentages of 
women who are married (especially in the 
two  younges t  age  groups ) ,  and  
substantially lower infant and child 
mortality rates, net of education and other 
factors. Net of the effects of education and 
urban residence, there is a significant time 
trend indicating increased use of modern 
contraception over time among women in 
all age groups, and likewise infant and 
child mortality decline significantly as time 
goes by, holding constant the effects of 
other factors.   There is no significant time 
trend with respect to the percentage of 
women in union.
11
11 The fact that infant and child mortality rates are not 
measured separately for the different age groups may 
contribute to the weak performance of the secondary-plus 
schooling variable in accounting for differences in infant and 
child mortality. 
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Table 4. Educational Attainment and Contraception, Marriage, and Mortality 
 
a. Percentage using modern contraceptives 
Age 
group Urban 
Percentage with 
No  
Education         Secondary+ 
Time 
Trend Intercept 
 
R2 
15-19 2.7* -.00 .05* .20+ .67 .239 
20-24 6.06** -.07** .05* .70** 2.84 .381 
25-29 7.25** -.06* .11** .89** 2.31 .404 
30-34 7.56** -.07** .11** .83** 3.91 .421 
35-39 8.00** -.12** .06+ .68** 9.42** .456 
40-44 6.92** -.09** .10** .54* 8.49* .448 
45-49 3.68* -.06** .11** .34* 6.28* .377 
 
 
 
 
 
b. Percentage in union 
Age 
group Urban 
Percentage with 
No  
Education        Secondary+ 
Time 
Trend Intercept 
 
R2 
15-19 -8.83** .20** -.08+ -.32 31.5** .498 
20-24 -14.84** .13** -.10* -.29 73.65** .517 
25-29 -5.87** .09** -.14** -.07 83.03** .481 
30-34 -3.41* .07** -.10** -.14 85.72** .453 
35-39 -3.03+ .08** -.09* -.24 85.21** .362 
40-44 -4.89** .08** -.02 -.23 81.19** .302 
45-49 -6.11** .06+ -.05 -.39+ 80.46** .265 
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c.  Infant and Child Mortality1 
Age 
group Urban 
Percentage with 
No  
Education        Secondary+ 
Time 
Trend Intercept 
 
R2 
15-19 -42.22** .18** -.07 -2.74** 203.75** .336 
20-24 -43.77** .11* -.05 -2.83** 207.84** .310 
25-29 -43.91** .08 -.08 -2.83** 207.84** .302 
30-34 -44.08** .07 -.09 -2.80** 207.76** .300 
35-39 -44.14** .10 -.06 -2.78** 204.99** .303 
40-44 -44.46** .08 -.08 -2.75** 205.15** .296 
45-49 -45.31** .09 -.06 -2.77** 204.17** .292 
 
** Significant at the .01 level. 
*   Significant at the .05 level. 
+   Significant at the .10 level. 
Sample size = 96.  Estimates from SUR model. 
 
1Mortality is not measured separately by age group, but simply separately by place of 
residence. 
The final step in these multivariate 
analyses is given by Table 5, which 
provides reduced-form estimates that more 
clearly emphasize the importance of 
educational attainment, or perhaps more 
accurately, the importance of exposure to 
schooling, for fertility and fertility 
transition in sub-Saharan Africa.  These 
equations omit modern contraceptive 
prevalence, percentage married, and infant 
and child mortality, and simply examine 
age-specific fertility rates as a function of 
educational attainment, urban residence, 
and the time trend.  Comparison of 
coefficients in Table 5 with those in Table 3 
shows the effects of omitting contraception, 
marriage, and mortality from the equation.
The coefficients on the first 
education variable indicate that higher 
percentages of women with no schooling 
are consistently associated with greater 
age-specific fertility rates, and in four cases 
the coefficients are significant.  This 
contrasts sharply with the anomalous 
negative coefficients for the three youngest 
groups of women reported in Table 3.  
Greater percentages of women with 
secondary or higher education are 
associated with lower fertility rates for all 
but the oldest women, but with one 
exception the differences are not 
statistically significant. Urban-rural 
fertility differences, other things equal, are 
highly significant and consistently larger 
than those reported in Table 3, especially 
for the women under age 40.  The 
18
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coefficients of the time trend variables are 
all negative and significant.  As with the 
urban variable, the coefficients of the time 
trend variable are larger in absolute value 
than those reported in Table 3, reflecting 
the correlations with time and urban 
residence of contraception, marriage, and 
mortality. 
Table 5. Reduced-Form Estimates of the Impact of Education, Urban  
Residence, and Time on Age-Specific Fertility Rates 
Age 
group Urban 
Percentage with 
No  
Education        Secondary+ 
Time 
Trend Intercept 
 
R2 
15-19 -44.23** .51** -.06 -2.15** 163.46* .447 
20-24 -73.42** .17 -.18 -2.60** 307.07** .556 
25-29 -58.66** .20 -.03 -2.74** 296.17** .504 
30-34 -51.91** .29* -.10 -1.70+ 246.40** .407 
35-39 -46.35** .28** -.21 -2.12** 190.27** .550 
40-44 -35.63** .04 -.22+ -1.76** 115.20** .556 
45-49 -17.54** .13* .03 -1.02** 37.79** .410 
 
** Significant at the .01 level. 
*   Significant at the .05 level. 
+   Significant at the .10 level. 
Sample size = 96.  Estimates from SUR model. 
Discussion and Conclusions
Using data for countries with 
multiple DHS surveys, we have examined 
fertility behavior in two dozen countries in 
sub-Saharan Africa, representing about 
three-quarters of the population of the 
region.  Nearly all of these countries have 
experienced the onset of fertility transition, 
and in about 65 percent of the countries in 
which transition has begun the most recent 
DHS surveys suggest that fertility decline 
is still under way.  However, the pace of 
decline is slow in several of these countries, 
and stalling of fertility decline is evident in 
the remaining countries where fertility 
decline had begun, with some of the 
stalling countries being in mid-transition 
while others are still in an early stage of 
fertility transition.  
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Examination of national-level 
changes in fertility in relation to changes in 
variables presumed to be related to fertility 
found significant associations for two 
schooling variables, the lagged infant and 
child mortality rate (5q0), and for lagged 
growth in GDP per capita.  The first two of 
these findings suggest, as Bongaarts (2005) 
has postulated, that stalling of fertility 
decline may reflect faltering in the pace of 
socioeconomic development.  At the same 
time, the results indicating that higher 
growth in GDP per capita was associated 
with smaller declines in fertility run 
counter to this notion.  Further, we did not 
f ind evidence of  any s ignif icant  
relationships between changes in fertility 
and changes in modern contraceptive use 
or ideal fertility.
Disaggregation of national-level 
data to urban and rural components 
reveals additional differences, with fertility 
transition typically being distinctly 
stronger in urban areas.  Our multivariate 
analyses of age-specific fertility rates 
document that education, infant and child 
mortality, modern contraceptive use, the 
percentage of women in union, place of 
residence, and time all are significantly 
related to fertility levels, and hence 
presumably influence changes in fertility 
as well.  We put particular emphasis on 
increasing education as a key factor in 
promoting fertility decline, in large part 
because of its association with marriage, 
contraceptive use, and infant and child 
mortality.
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Fig. 1.   Decline in the Total Fertility Rate per Year, Stalling and Declining Countries 
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What is the future of fertility 
transition in the region?  Our data analyses 
suggest that in part, the answer will 
depend on the future of changes in 
education and in infant and child 
m o r t a l i t y .   I f  t h e  l o n g e r - t e r m  
improvements in these socioeconomic 
indicators that have been realized in the 
past do not continue throughout the region 
(i.e., with stagnation or backsliding), then 
the stalling phenomenon may well spread 
to additional countries. Conversely, 
stronger progress in increasing women's 
education and reducing infant and child 
mortality in the future would be expected 
to enhance the likelihood of resumption of 
fertility decline in the stalling countries.  
But even with resumption of 
fertility decline, however, the question 
remains, how far might fertility fall?  As 
Bongaarts (2002) has noted, it is not at all 
apparent that assuming that fertility will 
fall to the replacement level (as in United 
Nations fertility projections) is the 
appropriate assumption.  Indeed, in what 
may well have been a very prescient 
observation, Lesthaeghe (1989b) almost 20 
years ago raised the possibility that fertility 
decline in sub-Saharan Africa might stall at 
high levels (4-5 children), reflecting the 
old-age security function of children.  This 
raises the possibility that even sustained or 
resumed socioeconomic development, in 
the absence of alternative mechanisms for 
old-age security, would not be sufficient to 
prevent stalling on a wider basis.
In the meantime, however, the 
policy implications are clear.  Countries 
that seek to avoid stalling and to maintain 
or accelerate fertility decline should 
pursue policies and programmes aiming to 
realize increased schooling for women and 
reduced infant and child mortality.
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